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Cyber security

The mouse that moved by itself: what a hidden infection taught us

Published3 October 2026
Reading time8 min read
AuthorJames Powell
In short

A hidden remote access infection sat on a client PC for around seven weeks before anyone noticed, evading antivirus the whole time by excluding its own files from being scanned. It was only spotted because a member of staff saw the mouse moving by itself and reported it straight away, and multi-factor authentication stopped the intruder reaching the payment account at the last hurdle. Names, dates and other identifying details have been removed.

How it unfolded From first install to the moment it was spotted
About 7 weeks before First hidden program installed; one file flagged That evening, days later Two more installs, one just after midnight Early September AV flags a hidden loader, reports it removed, files remain About 7 weeks after Live control seen; staff report it straight away

A detection partway through didn't end it, the pieces that kept it running were left behind until the infection was finally caught live.

What happened

Recently, staff at a small business we support walked into their office and saw something unsettling. A PC that nobody was using was moving its own mouse and typing into a search box. Within about a minute, the company's online payment dashboard had been opened on it, and the payment provider asked for an extra verification step. By the time anyone reached the desk, the text had been deleted and the activity had stopped.

The staff reported it straight away, which was exactly the right thing to do. This article explains what we found, what we still don't know, and what we'd suggest every business checks. Names, dates and other identifying details have been removed.

Someone, or something, was controlling the PC live. They opened the payment dashboard, which then asked for a second verification step. As far as we can tell, that step was never completed, so the intruder didn't get any further into the payment account. That's encouraging, but the payment provider's own sign-in records are the proper place to confirm it. The PC was restarted shortly afterwards, and we began investigating.

The first checks found nothing

We looked for the usual suspects first. No common remote access tools were installed, the kind of software used for remote support. Our own support tool showed no session at that time. The Windows sign-in records showed nothing unexpected in the period they covered.

This is where many investigations stop, and it's a trap. Many remote tools run inside the user's own session, so they leave very little behind. An empty list of remote tools does not mean a clean machine.

What we found

Digging into scheduled tasks, startup entries and the security software's own logs told a different story. There were several hidden scheduled tasks, each one starting a hidden program at sign-in or once a day.

The hidden program itself was Python, a genuine programming runtime that security software doesn't treat as suspicious on its own, a legitimate tool used for the wrong purpose. The harmful part was kept scrambled in a data file and only unscrambled in memory when it ran.

The tasks and files borrowed names that sounded like routine updaters, and one folder was dressed up to look like a Microsoft Store app. The genuine software from the chipset maker on the same PC was checked separately and was properly signed, a reminder that a trusted name proves nothing on its own.

Most tellingly, it told the security software to look away. Each later install added exceptions to Windows' built-in security, so that its own folders and the Python program were ignored, within seconds of being installed. Making that change needs administrator rights, and the everyday user account had them.

A timeline in plain terms

About seven weeks before the incident, the first hidden program was installed. Windows security flagged and quarantined a file on the same day, but the hidden program installed alongside it stayed in place. That evening, and again a few days later, two more sets were installed, the second just after midnight, with nobody at the PC.

In early September, security software flagged a hidden command loader. It reported the item as removed, but the files remained, and one of the tasks was changed again afterwards. About seven weeks after the first install, someone controlled the PC live, which is when staff noticed.

Why antivirus didn't stop it

It excluded itself. The exceptions it added meant its folders and its Python program were never scanned. The harmful part was hidden, scrambled on disk and unscrambled in memory, so the files didn't look suspicious. It started quietly, scheduled tasks and hidden windows meant nothing appeared on screen.

Detection isn't removal. Some items were caught and dealt with, but the pieces that keep it running were left behind, and an earlier alert was investigated with extra scans without removing them.

What we did

We treated the PC as untrustworthy and factory reset it rather than trying to clean it. With several independent hiding places, we couldn't be confident that a clean-up would be complete. We are checking the other machines with a script built from what we found, and so far, those checked have come back clean.

What we don't know yet

We haven't established how the first file reached the PC. It may have been something downloaded or run, possibly dressed up as an update, but that's a guess based on a file name, and we'd rather say so than speculate. We also haven't identified the malware family. The investigation is still going.

Lessons for any business

Take administrator rights away from everyday accounts. Administrator rights didn't cause the problem, but they allowed it to go further, including telling the security software to ignore its files and setting itself up to restart.

Turn on multi-factor authentication for payment, email and admin accounts. Here, it stopped the intruder at the last hurdle.

Review your antivirus exceptions. Know what's on the list and why. Some are legitimate, management agents often add their own, but unexplained folders or programs should be questioned.

Look at scheduled tasks and startup entries, especially anything that runs a hidden window or starts from an unusual folder.

Treat a detection as the start of an investigation, not the end. Ask what else was dropped alongside it.

Run one active antivirus product, and check that it really is switched on.

Keep logs for longer. Windows' sign-in log only reached back a short way, which limited what we could confirm.

Preserve evidence before you wipe, and reset passwords from a clean device. Assume saved passwords and logged-in sessions on an affected PC are exposed.

Know your reporting duties. If personal data may be involved, you need to assess whether to report a personal data breach to the ICO, within 72 hours of becoming aware.

Make it easy for staff to speak up. The person who noticed the moving cursor and reported it straight away made the biggest difference of all.

Quick checks you can run yourself

These three commands only read information and change nothing. Run them in an administrator PowerShell window.

Who has administrator rights on this PC:

Get-LocalGroupMember -Group 'Administrators'

What your Windows security software has been told to ignore:

foreach ($k in 'Paths','Processes','Extensions') {
  "== $k =="
  (Get-Item "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\$k" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).GetValueNames()
}

Scheduled tasks that aren't part of Windows, and what they run:

Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.TaskPath -notlike '\Microsoft\*' } | ForEach-Object {
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Name   = $_.TaskName
    State  = $_.State
    Action = (($_.Actions | ForEach-Object { "$($_.Execute) $($_.Arguments)" }) -join ' | ')
  }
} | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap

A few notes before you worry about what you find. Plenty of legitimate software adds exceptions and scheduled tasks, an entry is a reason to ask a question, not proof of a problem. A scheduled task that launches a hidden window, or runs a program from a folder like ProgramData or a user profile, deserves a closer look. If another antivirus product is installed, Windows' built-in settings may show as switched off, that's normal, but it means the other product is your only protection.

Common questions

How did the attacker control the PC without any remote access software showing up?

The hidden program was launched by scheduled tasks and ran as Python, a genuine programming tool that security software doesn't flag on its own. The harmful part was kept scrambled in a data file and only unscrambled in memory when it ran, which is why our usual checks, remote access tools, our own support sessions and Windows sign-in records, showed nothing unusual at first.

Why didn't the antivirus catch it?

It excluded itself. Within seconds of each install, the program added its own folders and processes to Windows' built-in exclusions, so they were never scanned. The harmful part was also hidden on disk and only appeared in memory, and it started quietly through scheduled tasks rather than anything visible on screen.

Does having antivirus installed mean a PC is safe?

Not on its own. In this case, the security software did flag some items along the way, but detection isn't the same as removal. The pieces that kept the infection running were left behind after each alert, which is why we'd encourage any business to treat a detection as the start of an investigation, not the end of one.

What's the single biggest change a business can make after reading this?

Taking administrator rights away from everyday user accounts. It didn't cause this infection, but it's what let it go further, including telling the security software to ignore its own files. Turning on multi-factor authentication for payment, email and admin accounts is a close second, it's what stopped this intruder at the last hurdle.

Do we have to report an incident like this to the ICO?

That depends on whether personal data may have been involved. If it has, you need to assess whether it counts as a personal data breach and, if so, report it to the ICO within 72 hours of becoming aware. It's worth having that assessment process agreed with your IT provider before you ever need it.

Not sure what's hiding on your network?

We can run the same checks across your business, administrator rights, antivirus exclusions and scheduled tasks, and tell you plainly what we find.

Get in touch